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Flodden 1513: Re-examining British Warfare at the 
End of the Middle Ages

David Grummitt
It is something of a cliché to state that Flodden remains one of the most poorly documented and misunderstood of late medieval, or perhaps even 
“Renaissance,” battles. Despite a lurry of publications to coincide with the ive 
hundredth anniversary and a great deal of public interest spurred on by generously 
funded local projects, there are still many misunderstandings and errors that 
have come to be commonplaces when discussing the levying, composition, and 
equipment of the two armies and the course of the battle that took place on 9 
September 1513.1 hese assumptions have led to a generally accepted narrative 
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Abstract
On 9 September 1513 a Scottish army led by King James IV was de-
cisively defeated by an English army, led by Thomas Howard, earl of 
Surrey. Most recent scholarship on the battle has concentrated on new 
European-style tactics of the Scots, part of James’s ultimately futile 
effort to introduce a “Renaissance-style” of kingship. This article re-
examines the battle from the English perspective, arguing the English 
army was more “modern” in terms of its weaponry, tactics, and military 
organization and, second, that in the person of Thomas Howard they 
beneitted from the leadership of Britain’s irst “Renaissance general.”
1. George Goodwin, Fatal Rivalry, Flodden 1513: Henry VIII, James IV and the Battle for 
Renaissance Britain (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2013); Peter Reese, Flodden: A Scottish 
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of battle which is only partly grounded in fact and owes much to supposition and 
imaginative reconstructions of the ighting itself. his article will irst examine the 
ways in which the two armies were recruited, before moving on to discuss how 
they were armed and equipped, and, crucially for our understanding of the battle 
itself, the way in which they may have fought. It will argue that the tendency for 
recent scholarship to concentrate on the Scottish experience of the battle has 
led to an underestimation of the innovative and efective leadership, military 
organisation, and tactics of the English. 
he obstacles to understanding the composition and ighting abilities of the 
English and Scottish armies are many. Principal among these, of course, is the 
relative paucity of the documentary record.2 he lacunae in the Scottish sources, 
the unfortunate gap in the treasurer of Scotland’s accounts among other things, 
are well known, but the English sources are also uncharacteristically meagre. In 
contrast to his counterpart, Sir John Daunce, treasurer of war for Henry VIII’s 
campaign in France, Surrey’s treasurer, his brother-in-law Sir Philip Tilney, has 
left only his inal declared account.3 Paradoxically, the speed and eiciency with 
which the king’s lieutenant in the north gathered, deployed, and disbanded his 
army probably resulted in a shorter paper trail than its rather more cumbersome 
counterpart across the Channel. hus scholars and popular writers alike have 
based their narratives of the campaign largely on a motley collection of post-battle 
reports, later chronicles, and imaginative interpretations conjured from what was 
happening in much better documented contemporary European battles.4 Equally, 
Tragedy (Edinburgh: Berlinn, 2013); Rosy Serdiville and John Sadler, he Battle of Flodden 1513 
(Stroud, Gloucestershire, U.K.: History Press, 2013). he way in which the quincentennial an-
niversary of Flodden captured the popular imagination is evident by a rash of imaginative inter-
pretations (Rosemary Goring, After Flodden [Edinburgh: Berlinn, 2013]; Noel Hodgson, Heron’s 
Flight: Battle of Flodden 1513 [Galashiels, Selkirkshire, U.K.: Reiver Press, 2013]) and the fund-
ing of projects such as the Flodden ecomuseum and a host of other community-driven initiatives 
(www.lodden1513.com). 
2. A more optimistic assessment of the documentary record is expressed in Patrick J. Par-
sons, “Flodden Field: the sources and archaeology of a ‘marvelouse greate conlicte,’” in Fields 
of Conlict: Progress and Prospect in Battleield Archaeology, ed. P. W. M. Freeman and A. Pollard 
(Oxford: Archaeopress, 2001), 51–60.
3. E101/56/27, he National Archives (PRO), United Kingdom [hereafter TNA]; and 
Egerton MS 2603, f. 30, British Library, London [hereafter BL], both printed in J. D. Mackie, 
“he English Army at Flodden,” Publications of the Scottish History Society, 3rd ser., 43 (1951): 
35–85. For the mass of documentation relating to the 1513 French campaign on the other hand, 
see Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII, ed. J. S. Brewer, R. H. 
Brodie, and J. Gairdner, 23 vols. (London, 1862–1932), vol. 1, pt. 2.
4. he most important contemporary accounts of the battle are: 1) he Articles of the Batail 
bitwix the Kinge of Scottes and therle of Surrey in Brankestone Feld, the ix day of September (SP49/1, 
f. 17–19, TNA); 2) a letter from Brian Tuke, Henry VIII’s clerk of the signet, to Cardinal Bain-
bridge dated 22 September 1513 (Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English 
Afairs, existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and other Libraries in North Italy, vol. 2, 
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recent attempts to rehabilitate the ighting reputation of both the English and 
Scottish armies in the light of the “Military Revolution” and the development of 
a distinctive style of warfare in the early sixteenth century, informed in part by 
wider European cultural and intellectual changes, have actually obscured the real 
dynamic of what occurred on the Anglo-Scottish border in September 1513.5
I
he irst question asked of any medieval or early modern battle is the size of 
the forces involved. Yet this simple enquiry is often the most di cult to answer. 
Chroniclers were notoriously prone to exaggeration, while even documentary 
sources (if they survive at all) tell us more about the number of men raised and 
paid for than the numbers actually involved in ighting. hese problems are acute 
for the battle of Flodden, particularly for the Scottish army. Nevertheless, the 
methods for raising men for war were ostensibly similar in England and Scotland 
and had changed little over the course of the ifteenth century, even if the potential 
military resources of the two kingdoms were signiicantly diferent. Both James 
IV and Henry VIII relied on their subjects’ long-established obligations to assist 
them in the defence of their realms, and both kings augmented the numbers raised 
in this fashion by individual agreements with their leading subjects. In 1285 the 
Statute of Winchester had ordained that each able-bodied Englishman between 
the ages of sixteen and sixty should be able to serve for forty days a year and have 
arms and weapons appropriate to his wealth and social status. By the 1290s the 
oversight of this system was in the hands of specially appointed commissions 
of array, usually led by the leading nobleman of the county and comprising 
prominent landowners. hroughout the fourteenth century the commissioners also 
developed a system of quality control, checking the war-readiness of the county 
levies and enforcing the statutory requirements. he alternative practice of raising 
armies by contracting with individual captains meant that the importance of the 
commissions of array for assembling expeditionary forces diminished during the 
later fourteenth century, but they continued to be issued frequently, especially in 
the coastal and border counties, and were vital in maintaining English society at 
some degree of military preparedness. he Statute of Winchester was reissued in 
1509–1515, ed. Rawdon Brown [London: HMSO, 1867], 133–35); 3) the newsletter entitled 
he Trewe Encountre or . . . Batayle lately don between Englande and Scotlande (London: R. Faques, 
?1513), STC 11088.5; 4) a printed newsletter, horde and behauyoure of the right honourable Erle 
of Surrey tresour and Marshal of Englande ayenst the kynge of Scottes and the Inuasions howe the same 
kynge at the Batayle of Brakston was slayne by the sayd erle, now surviving only in manuscript (Ad-
ditional Manuscripts 29506 [hereafter Add. MS], BL); 5) a letter from homas Ruthal, bishop 
of Durham, to homas Wolsey (SP1/5, f. 47–48v, TNA; Letters and Papers, vol. 1, pt. 2:4461).
5. Gervase Phillips, he Anglo-Scots Wars 1513–1550 (Woodbridge, Sufolk, U.K.: Boydell 
and Brewer, 1999), 117–33; Niall Barr, Flodden 1513 (Stroud, Gloucestershire, U.K.: Tempus, 
2001); James Raymond, Henry VIII’s Military Revolution: the Armies of Sixteenth-Century Britain 
and Europe (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), esp. 36–39.
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6. Jeremy Goring, “Social Change and Military Decline in Mid-Tudor England,” History 60 
(1975): 185–97; Steven Gunn, David Grummitt, and Hans Cools, War, State and Society in England 
and the Habsburg Netherlands, 1477–1559 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 20–21.
7. Gervase Phillips, “Scotland in the Age of Military Revolution, 1488–1560,” in A Military 
History of Scotland, ed. E. M. Spiers, J. A. Crang, and M. J. Strickland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2012), 184; Gladys Dickinson, “Some Notes on the Scottish Army in the First 
Half of the Sixteenth Century,” Scottish Historical Review 28 (1949): 133–45.
1437 and 1442, while Henry VIII signalled his bellicose intentions by reissuing 
the statute in 1511.6 In Scotland the king’s subjects had been required to present 
themselves at “wappinschaws” since at least the thirteenth century, and the arms 
and armour each man was required to provide had been set by statute since 1318. 
In 1457 and 1491 the frequency of “wappinschaws” was set at four times a year. 
Like their counterparts across the border, Scotsmen were expected to serve for a 
maximum of forty days at their own expense.7
Alongside this system of national levies, both the English and Scottish kings 
relied on their landowners to provide men. In England during the fourteenth 
century this had been formalised through indentures for war, a process whereby 
individual captains contracted with the crown to bring a certain number of 
men, fully furnished for war, to the muster and to serve for royal wages for a 
ixed period of time (usually six months or a year). he indenture system had 
Henry VIII (left), from Frank Arthur Mumby, he Youth of Henry VIII: A Narrative 
in Contemporary Letters (Boston: Houghton Milin Co., 1913), frontispiece; James IV 
(right), from Grant R. Francis, Scotland’s Royal Line: he Tragic House of Stuart 
(New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1929), facing page 22.
 Flodden 1513 Revisited
  13MILITARY HISTORY
8. Simon Walker, he Lancastrian Ainity 1361–1399 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 39–80; Anthony Goodman, he Wars of the Roses: he Soldiers’ Experience (Stroud, Glouc-
estershire, U.K.: Tempus, 2005), 78–125.
9. Jenny Wormald, Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent, 1442–1603 (Edinburgh: 
John Donald Publishers, 1985), 13–20, 34–51; Michael Brown, he Black Douglases: War and 
Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland 1300–1455 (East Linton, East Lothian, U.K.: Tuckwell Press, 
1998), 132–56.
10. David Grummitt, “he Court, War and Noble Power in England, c.1475–1558,” in he 
Court as a Stage, ed. Steven Gunn and Antheun Janse (Woodbridge, Sufolk, U.K.: Boydell and 
Brewer, 2006), 145–55; Grummitt, he Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 
1436–1558 (Woodbridge, Sufolk, U.K.: Boydell and Brewer, 2008). 
furnished the vast majority of men who had fought in the Hundred Years War 
(1337–1453). Yet, despite its ostensibly mercenary nature, the English indenture 
system relied on lordship and the chivalric bond between the lord and his servant 
for its efectiveness. he most successful military retinues of the Hundred Years 
War, such as those of John of Gaunt in the 1360s and 1370s and of Henry V, 
were brotherhoods-in-arms, where ties of loyalty through household service 
reinforced bonds forged on campaign. During the Wars of the Roses (1455–1487) 
military indentures continued to be sealed by both the crown and its rivals, but 
the reciprocal obligations they enshrined said more about contemporary ideals of 
loyalty and service than mere monetary transactions.8 In Scotland, on the other 
hand, by the mid-ifteenth century the reciprocal obligations of lords and men in 
both peace and war were formalised in bonds of manrent. It is di cult to see how 
these difered in practice from the informal, but still clearly binding, obligations 
that enabled the Douglasses and other great Scottish families to put armies 
numbering in the thousands in the ield in the fourteenth and early ifteenth 
centuries; nevertheless, the bonds provided Scottish lords with sizeable followings 
that could be used to pursue private feuds, as well as providing the king with a 
much more reliable source of military manpower than the traditional levy.9
In both England and Scotland, however, the cultural assumptions and 
political circumstances that determined the balance of power between the 
king and his subjects had undergone important changes in the decades before 
Flodden. In England the essential reciprocity of obligation that had underpinned 
the indenture system of the fourteenth and early ifteenth centuries was being 
replaced by a system that increasingly stressed the subjects’ obligations to provide 
exclusive military service to the crown. his development was evident from the 
1470s. Instead of relying on the essentially private power of individual lords, the 
crown relied on a combination of household service and exploiting the manpower 
resources of the burgeoning royal lands: for example, William, Lord Hastings, 
Edward IV’s household chamberlain, was also chief steward of important Duchy 
of Lancaster lands in the north midlands, as well as being lieutenant of the 
English garrison at Calais.10 Similarly, Steven Gunn has shown the importance 
of Sir homas Lovell, one of Henry VII’s most important household servants, 
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11. Grummitt, “Court, War and Noble Power,” 146–47; Steven Gunn, “Sir homas Lovell 
(c.1449–1524): a New Man in a New Monarchy?,” in he End of the Middle Ages?, ed. John Watts 
(Stroud, Gloucestershire, U.K.: Sutton Publishing, 1995), 117–54; Sean Cunningham, “National 
War and Dynastic Politics: Henry VII’s Capacity to Wage War in the Scottish Campaigns of 
1496–1497,” in England and Scotland at War, c.1296–1513, ed. Andy King and David Simpkin 
(Leiden: Brill, 2012), 297–328; Steven Gunn, Henry VII’s New Men and the Making of Tudor 
England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 88–109. 
12. Jane E. A. Dawson, Scotland Re-Formed 1488–1547 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007), 31–58.
in mobilising the military resources of the midlands for the irst Tudor king. 
Indeed, Henry VII appears to have had a policy to replace the private power of 
the aristocracy with the public authority of the king’s oicers, the stewards of royal 
lands and other oice-holders, to raise men for war. In 1487 the king reserved the 
sole right to muster royal tenants for war and later granted licences to individuals 
to retain men from the crown lands, tying individuals tighter within the nexus of 
royal service. Other military institutions developed in the king’s favour: in 1491 
Parliament passed an act requiring captains to provide exactly the number of men 
contained within their indentures on pain of forfeiture and imprisonment. Henry 
VII’s two major military campaigns, his invasion of France in 1492 and the army 
he assembled against the Scots ive years later, exemplify these trends. Less than a 
third of the nearly 13,000 men assembled in 1492 were from noble retinues (and 
of that proportion a third or so were assembled by ive lords closely associated with 
the king himself ), while in 1497 some 70 percent of the 7,000-strong vanguard 
were provided by men commanding contingents from crown lands in Wales, the 
palatinates of Chester and Lancaster, and the duchy of Cornwall. he inevitable 
result of these developments was the disappearance of the reciprocal indenture of 
war in favour of a system whereby the crown raised men primarily from its own 
lands, led into battle by lords and knights tied to the king through personal service 
and membership of his household.11
In Scotland similar pressures manifested themselves in diferent ways. While 
James IV lacked the landed resources enjoyed by Henry VII and could not aford to 
disregard the private resources of his greatest lords, the balance of power between 
the Scottish crown and its subjects appears to have been shifting in favour of the 
former. From 1495 James had set about re-asserting royal authority in a manner 
not that diferent from his future father-in-law across the border: he attempted to 
curb the independent power of his nobility; he had set about strengthening royal 
control over the Scottish church; and he began to exploit the crown lands both 
inancially and politically by enforcing the feudal obligations of his tenants-in-
chief.12 More importantly, perhaps, with regard to the ability of the crown to wage 
war, James oversaw a redeinition of the chivalric bond between the king and his 
subjects. As Katie Stevenson has shown, knighthood was an important tool in the 
armoury of the Stewart kings eager to enhance the prestige and authority of the 
crown. James IV self-consciously asserted his role as the patron and champion of 
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13. Katie Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood in Scotland 1424–1513 (Woodbridge, Suf-
folk, U.K.: Boydell and Brewer, 2006), 185–92.
14. Anne Curry, Adrian R. Bell, Andy King, and David Simpkin, “New Regime, New 
Army? Henry IV’s Expedition of 1400,” English Historical Review 125 (2010): 1382–1413; Sean 
Cunningham, “he Yorkists at War: Military Leadership in the English War with Scotland 
1480–1482,” in he Yorkist Age, ed. Hannes Kleineke and Christian Steer (Stamford, Lincoln-
shire, U.K.: Shaun Tyas, 2013), 175–84; Ian Arthurson, “he King’s Voyage into Scotland: the 
War that Never Was,” in England in the Fifteenth Century, ed. D. Williams (Woodbridge, Suf-
folk, U.K.: Boydell and Brewer, 1987), 1–21.
15. David Grummitt, “A Military Revolution in the North? he Impact of Gunpowder 
Weaponry on the Anglo-Scottish Marches in the Fifteenth Century,” in King and Simpkin, eds., 
England and Scotland at War, 290–91.
16. Charles Cruickshank, Henry VIII and the Invasion of France (Stroud, Gloucestershire, 
U.K.: Alan Sutton, 1990), 30–34; Helen Miller, Henry VIII and the English Nobility (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 133–43.
chivalric values, dubbing men in the ield and subsequently bestowing upon them 
positions of military responsibility, while cultivating a chivalric ethos at court 
through jousts. By tying men directly to his service, through the development of 
personal chivalric bonds of loyalty, James may have been attempting to cultivate a 
military class dedicated to the fulilment of his ambitions as a Renaissance prince 
on both the domestic and the European stage.13
he efect of these developments both north and south of the border was 
that both realms could put in the ield in 1513 armies much larger than had been 
the norm for much of the ifteenth century. In 1400 Henry IV of England had 
marched north with an army of 1,771 men-at-arms and 11,314 archers, and two 
years later, at Humbleton Hill, the English army numbered some 15,000. In 1482 
Richard, duke of Gloucester, may have assembled as many as 20,000 men for 
the campaign that ended in the capture of Berwick-upon-Tweed, while in 1497 
Henry VII sent an army of some 10,000 to the Scottish border (albeit part of a 
much larger mobilisation of manpower in England in that year).14 hese armies, 
however, were exceptional and represented the might of an “army royal” sent 
against Scotland. Usually English armies raised for service in the north appear 
to have been small afairs, with the forces at the disposal of the various English 
wardens of the marches and lieutenants normally numbering in the hundreds 
rather than the thousands. For example, the English forces mustered under the 
command of the wardens of the East March in 1435 and in 1448 were little more 
than large-scale raids.15 In 1513, however, the earl of Surrey’s army, as we shall 
see, numbered well in excess of 20,000. Moreover, this was not an “army royal”; it 
represented a traditional mobilisation of the north for defence against the Scots 
while the bulk of the kingdom’s military resources had accompanied Henry VIII 
to France. Indeed, as Surrey marched north from Pontefract, some 30,000 of his 
fellow countrymen (including the premier northern nobleman, Henry Percy, 5th 
earl of Northumberland) were encamped with their king in northern France.16 
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17. he best discussion of the size of the Scottish army remains Fitzwilliam Elliot, he Battle 
of Flodden and the Raids of 1513 (Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1911), appendix ii. he truth is, how-
ever, that given the absence of documentary records on the Scottish part, the size of James’s army 
will never really be known. English reports made immediately after the battle made no mention of 
any notable discrepancy in size between the two armies, so the igure of “slightly under thirty-ive 
thousand ighting men” suggested by Elliot (p. 11) is a sound, if perhaps generous, estimate. he 
estimate of 42,000 made by John Sadler (Flodden 1513: Scotland’s Greatest Defeat [Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2006], 28) is based wholly on conjecture; the extant sources simply do not allow the 
Scottish host to be reconstructed in such detail. Barr’s igure of 29,000 (Flodden 1513, 149) is also 
simply conjecture based on a reading of the evidence presented by Elliot. Perhaps the best we can 
say about James’s army at Flodden is that it included a wider array of the Scottish nobility than 
previous Stewart kings had achieved, drawing together men from the length and breadth of the 
kingdom. his in itself was testimony perhaps to James’s success at state building.
18. Gunn, Grummitt, and Cools, War, State and Society, 133, 177, 190–92.
Equally, the size of James IV’s army, although notoriously di cult to estimate 
with any degree of certainty, probably exceeded that of previous Scottish hosts 
with a strength of perhaps 30,000 men on the eve of the battle.17
While the lack of records precludes any detailed analysis of the size or 
composition of James IV’s host, the English records do allow us to see how 
Surrey’s army exempliied some the developments outlined above. To begin with, 
homas Howard, earl of Surrey, demonstrates himself how the public authority 
of the crown had superseded the private power of individual noblemen in raising 
men. Surrey, of course, had fought alongside his father, the duke of Norfolk, for 
Richard III at Bosworth in 1485, and had only slowly been incorporated back 
into royal favour. In 1489 he had been restored to the earldom of Surrey and sent 
north following the murder of the 4th earl of Northumberland. He had no lands 
in the north, but was clearly a skilled soldier and administrator. His performance 
as king’s lieutenant in the north had underlined how loyalty to the crown and 
good service conferred personal status and power. While the earl may have been 
out of pocket for his years of service in the north from 1489, it certainly gained 
him prestige and power both at court and in the localities.18 As king’s lieutenant 
Surrey drew upon the full public authority of the crown to raise his army in 
1513: in August 1512 he had been commissioned to take musters of the northern 
counties and for the campaign he had access to the royal treasury at the abbey of 
St. Mary’s, York. He also received funds directly from John Heron, treasurer of the 
king’s chamber, as well as the proceeds of ecclesiastical taxation collected in the 
East Riding. It is clear that about half of his army, 9,512 men, had been mustered 
through the commissions of array in the northern counties and led by “dyverse 
lordes, knyghtes, squyres, gentlemen and yomen . . . frome sondrie places of the 
North parties.” Another 8,500 men came from the Palatinates of Lancashire and 
Cheshire, under the command of Sir Edward Stanley, ifth son of the 1st earl of 
Derby (d. 1504), and his brother James, bishop of Ely. It is interesting to note that 
the young homas Stanley, 2nd earl of Derby, had accompanied the king to France, 
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4434; Miller, English Nobility, 141.
20. Mackie, “English Army,” 75, 82–83; E101/56/27, TNA; Susan Vokes, “he Early Ca-
reer of homas, Lord Howard, Earl of Surrey and hird Duke of Norfolk, 1474–1525” (Unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hull, 1988), 89–90.
21. E405/69, rot. 1d, TNA; he Household Books of John Howard, Duke of Norfolk, 1462–71, 
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22. E. B. de Fonblanque, Annals of the House of Percy, 2 vols. (London: Richard Clay and 
Sons, 1867), 1:341; M. A. Hicks, “Dynastic Change and Northern Society: the Career of the 
underlining the fact that the Lancashire and Cheshire contingents marched under 
Surrey’s authority as king’s lieutenant, not as a Stanley retinue.19 
Surrey’s army was also bound, however, by personal ties to the lieutenant 
himself. His sons homas (who as Lord Admiral brought 1,000 men to the ield) 
and Edmund were present, while the earl’s treasurer of war was his brother-in-
law Sir Philip Tilney, and his step-son, John Bourchier, Lord Berners, served as 
marshal of the army. Moreover, Surrey’s own household and servants provided 
500 men for the lieutenant’s retinue. hese men probably formed the core of the 
English battle commanded by the earl that met James IV’s charge. It comprised ive 
captains, ive petty captains, one spear or “man-at-arms,” forty-three demi-lances, 
and 446 soldiers. We do not know the names of those present in Surrey’s retinue 
but it was, in all probability, a Howard warband recruited primarily from their 
East Anglian servants and tenants.20 he household accounts of Surrey’s father 
show how extensive the Howard military ainity was: in 1481 John Howard could 
equip 1,000 men from his estates for service at sea. When Lord homas Howard 
had gone to Guienne the previous year he had taken a retinue of 400 men drawn 
from his father’s East Anglian lands and Norwich, from the family estates in 
Sussex, and, possibly, from his wife’s estates in Humberside.21 Surrey’s connexions 
to northern families, fostered during his long lieutenancy in the north, also served 
him well in 1513. homas, 2nd Lord Dacre of Gilsland, the English warden of the 
marches in 1513, served in Surrey’s army with 1,500 border horsemen, as might 
be expected, but a more important contribution was that of the Yorkshire knight 
Sir Marmaduke Constable, who commanded the left wing of the English army. 
he Constables of Flamborough had a long association with the Percy family in 
the ifteenth century and in 1483 they had transferred their service to Richard, 
duke of Gloucester, King Edward IV’s brother and the lieutenant of the north. Sir 
Marmaduke was probably not present at the battle of Bosworth, but, like Surrey, 
he accommodated himself to the new regime in 1485 and served as one of Henry 
VII’s knights of the body. From 1489 he became a follower of the earl of Surrey, 
one of his key servants in the north, and in 1509 his new patron nominated him to 
a Garter stall. Constable served at Flodden alongside his sons Robert, Marmaduke, 
and John (the youngest two of whom were knighted by Surrey in the wake of the 
battle), as well as his brother William, two cousins, and his son-in-law.22 
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he English army at Flodden exempliied the early Tudors’ successful 
adaptation of the existing medieval forms of raising armies. Edward Hall’s estimate 
of 26,000 men arrayed with the earl of Surrey at Bolton in Glendale was probably 
not far of the mark.23 Like the English armies at Neville’s Cross, Otterburn, and 
Humbleton Hill, it consisted mainly of a levy from the northern counties, exploiting 
the obligations enshrined in the Statute of Winchester and the existing patterns 
of local lordship. Yet there were important changes. he eiciency with which 
the early Tudors executed commissions of array led to larger and better equipped 
armies and, indeed, the county levies would become increasingly important in 
providing the manpower for Henry’s armies as the reign progressed.24 he army’s 
commander owed his position not to his private resources, either in terms of men 
or land, in the north of England, but to the status and power he derived from his 
service to the king. It was the public authority that Surrey commanded as king’s 
lieutenant in the north that drew the traditional military class of the north to his 
banner, rather than his status as a great northern magnate.25 Nevertheless, the 
strength of the English army rested, in part, upon the private relationships that 
Surrey had forged. His own person at the battle was protected by family members 
and household retainers, while his personal relationship with northerners such as 
Constable was built upon a shared martial and chivalric culture. he Scottish army 
too demonstrated the Stewarts’ eforts to reine and improve existing medieval 
institutions. It also beneitted from James IV’s eforts to increase the authority 
of the crown. More importantly, perhaps, the size of the Scottish host, and the 
willingness of the Scottish military class to die for their king, were testimony to 
James’s success in redeining notions of chivalry and service to the king.
II
Much has been made in the recent literature of the efect of the European 
“Military Revolution” on Anglo-Scottish warfare in the early sixteenth century and, 
in particular, its impact on the armament and tactics of the respective armies. he 
English army, we are told, “looked decidedly second-rate and behind the times.” 
James IV, on the other hand, took his pretensions to be a Renaissance prince seriously 
and equipped the Scottish army with a modern artillery train and pikes, employing 
French captains in an attempt to train his levies in the style of the fashionable Swiss 
infantry. hese pretensions met the harsh reality of warfare at Flodden where the 
long-established English combination of the bill and the bow (not to mention the 
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Northumbrian terrain) nulliied the efects of James’s Swiss-style pikemen. he 
terrain also nulliied the efect of the Scots’ new cannon and after the battle the guns 
were taken by the English, who had few such weapons themselves as the majority of 
their modern ordnance had been taken to France by Henry VIII.26
Fortunately, the English evidence allows us to reappraise this commonly 
held view and suggest some slightly diferent ways in which the weaponry and 
tactics used at Flodden reveal how warfare was changing in Britain in the early 
sixteenth century. Ostensibly, the few surviving muster rolls from around the time 
of the battle of Flodden suggest that little had changed between the battles of 
Humbleton Hill and Flodden. he most extensive and best known of these is the 
list of able men, tenants of Henry, 10th Lord Cliford, mustered in Stainclife 
wapentake in the West Riding of Yorkshire in 1510–11.27 It is not a complete 
listing of the men available to Lord Cliford, omitting several manors as well as 
his household oicers and servants. he extant document, however, lists 324 men 
in thirty-one separate townships. Between them they mustered with some 220 
bows and ninety-six bills (the remaining individuals were listed without weapons 
or noted as being able to provide a man rather than serving in person). he ratio 
of bows to bills (some 2:1) is interesting and suggests that eforts had been made 
to maximise the military potential of this part of Yorkshire. Indeed, some men 
were noted as “archers,” rather than merely being in possession of a bow, while 
others were noted as being “able,” perhaps suggesting a degree of expertise.28 A 
comparison with the very few surviving ifteenth-century muster rolls suggests 
that the proportion of bows may have increased, perhaps testimony to the Tudors’ 
enforcement of the obligatory longbow practice and a more frequent and eicient 
system of muster and array. In 1449, for instance, the 290 men mustered in 
Cumberland by Sir Walter Strickland had an almost equal distribution of bills 
and bows. Alternatively, of course, the relative wealth of Stainclife wapentake 
compared to the border counties may account for the preponderance of more 
substantial yeomen who were able to muster as archers. Indeed, at least two of 
the townships mustered could aford to send their contingents to war horsed and 
harnessed at communal cost. Equally, we know from an analysis of muster rolls in 
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the city of York in the irst half of the sixteenth century that the men mustered as 
archers and sent to war were often recruited from men of suicient means to be 
assessed on their incomes for payment of parliamentary subsidies.29 Indeed, the 
most recent study of late medieval English armies has concluded that, in the main, 
“archers were drawn from those with some social standing and wherewithal,” and 
the relatively high proportion of men listed as archers in Surrey’s army may relect 
the deep engagement of northern society with the defence of their country.30
he importance of the longbow to English armies of the late Middle Ages is 
a commonplace, but its role and importance to early Tudor armies should not be 
underestimated. Steven Gunn has done much to remind us of the position of the 
longbow within the Tudor imagination as a potent symbol of English military 
prowess, but, even amidst the developments of the “Military Revolution,” it was also 
still a battle-winning weapon. As the ordinances made for the army of Charles the 
Bold, duke of Burgundy, in the 1470s show, the longbow could be used efectively 
as a short-range missile weapon fully integrated in an all-arms infantry force that 
included pikes, shorter pole arms, and handguns.31 Moreover, English commanders 
recognised the continued eicacy of the longbow, and it appears that eforts were 
made to maximise the potential of the English archery for the campaigns of 1513. In 
the previous year parliament had conirmed the requirement of English merchants 
trading in the Mediterranean to import “a grete nombre of bowstaves of Ewe . . . from 
those parties where they growe.”32 For the Flodden campaign Surrey had access to 
substantial numbers of war bows, presumably paid for by the crown and delivered to 
the north from the royal armoury at the Tower of London, designed to remedy any 
shortfall in the quantity and quality of bows provided by the contingents raised by the 
commissions of array. At the end of the campaign he had managed to recover no fewer 
than 5,143 longbows from his army and delivered them to Alnwick castle, along with 
4,055 sheaves of arrows, for eventual return to the royal armouries.33 
 Flodden 1513 Revisited
  21MILITARY HISTORY
34. For a discussion of early Tudor polearms, see Hildred, Weapons of Warre, 713–19. For 
pikemen at the battle of Bosworth, see Michael K. Jones, Bosworth 1485: Psychology of a Battle 
(Stroud, Gloucestershire, U.K.: Tempus, 2002), 165–69.
35. Charles Cruickshank, Henry VIII and the Invasion of France (Stroud, Gloucestershire, 
U.K.: Alan Sutton, 1990), 69.
36. Calendar of State Papers, Venice, 2:134; Letters and Papers, vol. 1, pt. 2:4661; Trewe 
Ecountre.
he earl of Surrey recorded these bows in a list of “the provysions and artillery” 
he had “saved” through his “policie” which he presented to the royal auditors early in 
1514. his document, now British Library Egerton MS 2603, f. 30, has been used 
by historians, principally J. D. Mackie, to help determine the size of the English 
host at Flodden, but it has not been exploited fully for what it tells us about the 
armament of Surrey’s army. Rather than being an old-fashioned mixture of bows 
and bills, the product of locally sourced and maintained weaponry, the army was 
largely equipped by the crown and armed with a variety of weapons that gave it a 
degree of tactical lexibility. Alongside the thousands of war bows that Surrey had 
distributed among his soldiers, he also claimed allowance for 2,602 “marespikes” 
that he had left at Alnwick. he “marespike” or “Moorish Pike” was the English 
equivalent of the eighteen-foot-long pike that the Scots carried in emulation of 
the Swiss. he English had included such weapons in their inventory since the 
1470s, and in Henry VII’s invasion of France in 1492 several captains had included 
among their retinues men armed with “marespikes” or “long speres.” he exact 
circumstances of their use in English armies remain obscure, but they had been used 
to good efect (albeit by French mercenaries) at the battle of Bosworth in 1485 when 
pikemen formed a defensive ring around Henry Tudor.34 At Flodden, then, at least 
one in ten Englishmen was armed with a long pike. Equally, the Egerton document 
records the return of 145 sets of “almayne revettes,” the mass-produced infantry 
half-armour consisting of breast and back plate, tassets to protect the thighs, and 
splints for the arms, articulated with rivets and internal leathers. his type of armour 
was commonly worn by pikemen on the continent and from the irst years of Henry 
VIII’s reign was imported in massive quantities to equip English soldiers.35 here is 
the strong possibility, then, that the front ranks of Surrey’s armies were armed with 
pikes, protecting the bowmen and billmen from the impact of the Scottish pikemen 
in the best tradition of contemporary all-arms infantry doctrine.
he English pole arm par excellence, and the battle-winning weapon at Flodden, 
was, of course, the Black Bill. hree contemporary sources—the letter written to 
Cardinal Pace by Brian Tuke, clerk of the signet; Bishop Ruthal’s letter to homas 
Wolsey; and he trewe encountre—mention how efective the bill was against the 
Scottish pike and how it accounted for many more Scotsmen than the longbow. 
Indeed, the latter states that the Scots were “as well apoynted as wal possible at all 
poyntes with Armoure & harneys so that fewe of them were slayne with arrows 
howbeit the bylles dyd bete and hewe them downe woth some payne and daunger 
to Englysshemen.”36 Interestingly, the Egerton manuscript makes no mention of 
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bills being stored after the battle at Alnwick. his is curious. We know that large 
numbers of munition-quality bills had been stored in royal armouries, such as that 
at Calais, during the ifteenth century, and that the bill continued to be the most 
important infantry polearm in English armies until at least the 1550s.37 It may be 
that the bills carried by the English soldiers at Flodden were their own, brought to 
the battle in accordance with their statutory obligations. Less than a third, however, 
of those mustered in Stainclife wapentake “Flodden Roll” were armed with a bill. 
Billmen have sometimes been seen as inferior to their bow-armed counterparts, but 
we should not make the mistake of assuming that those so armed were lesser in terms 
of military ability or social status to archers.38 Although originally derived from an 
agricultural implement, by the sixteenth century bills had become symbolic of English 
military prowess and could be wielded by men of substance. In the Stainclife muster 
several of those armed with a bill were of suicient status to also have full harness 
and a horse. he billmen in Surrey’s army, then, may have formed an elite minority, 
leaving the safety of the formations of bows and pikes to engage the irst ranks of the 
Scottish columns and, as Bishop Ruthal observed, “dissapoint[ing] the Scots of their 
long spears wherein was their greatest trust.” Signiicantly, earlier in the letter Ruthal 
described how the English beat the Scottish with “hand strokes of bills and halberds.” 
Large numbers of halberds were purchased for Henry VIII’s armies during the course 
of the reign, but the halberd was also a weapon of status (and as such carried by the 
king’s yeomen of the guard). Ruthal’s reference here may have been to European-style 
halberds, but it may equally have been to the poleaxe, the traditional polearm used by 
English men-at-arms of gentle status throughout the ifteenth century.39
he Egerton manuscript also reveals something of the use of gunpowder 
artillery at Flodden. Surrey left some ifty barrels of gunpowder at Alnwick, while 
he recorded the capture of seventeen pieces of Scottish ordnance worth 1,700 
marks (£1,166 13s. 4d). Recent histories of Flodden have made much of James IV’s 
eforts to expand and modernise his artillery train and its revolutionary potential 
to “project military power where it mattered most.” Indeed, James’s swift capture 
of Norham castle after a ive-day siege was testimony to the recent advances made 
in Scottish artillery. At Flodden itself, however, the Scottish artillery appears to 
have made little impact on the English lines, while the much smaller English 
artillery (twenty-three light pieces iring shot weighing between two and ive 
pounds), commanded by the skilled gunner William Blackenhall, seems to have 
been efective in harrying the enemy. Niall Barr sees the failure of the Scots to win 
what has been called the “irst British artillery duel” as a crucial factor in James’s 
defeat. Yet we should not overestimate the novelty or importance of gunpowder.40 
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Flodden was not the irst time rival armies, both armed with cannon, had faced 
each other on a British battleield. Both sides employed gunpowder weapons during 
the Wars of the Roses, and the recent archaeology of Bosworth has conirmed the 
presence of guns of various calibres. he English advantage in artillery was the 
product of nearly four decades of investment in the use of gunpowder weapons 
by successive English kings. Nevertheless, despite their indisputable presence on 
British battleields of the late ifteenth century, guns appear not to have had a 
revolutionary impact on battleield tactics or determined the outcome of individual 
battles. Instead, battleield tactics adapted slowly to accommodate the presence of 
guns, both cannon and by the 1470s hand-held irearms, on the battleield.41 At 
Flodden, it is argued, the unexpected ability of the English guns to cause casualties 
among the Scots at long range was one factor that prompted James to attack. Yet 
if this was the case then the Scots were remarkably ignorant both of the capability 
of artillery and the recent experience of Swiss, Spanish, and French armies in the 
Italian wars. It seems a nonsense to suggest, given the ubiquity of guns in both 
British and European warfare, that “the use of artillery was not fully understood 
by the gunners of the day.” Indeed, the “chroniclers and commanders who wrote 
of the engagement” seemed fully aware of the proper tactical employment of guns 
and the skill with which the English used their advantage in artillery.42
he question of the efectiveness of gunpowder weapons at Flodden brings us 
to the thorny historiographical question of the “Military Revolution” and whether 
the emerging “Renaissance style of warfare” had any impact on the outcome of the 
battle. Where in terms of recruitment, organisation, weaponry, and tactics both 
armies appear to have successfully melded both “old” and “new” forms of military 
organisation, there is one aspect where the English appear to have enjoyed an 
advantage. In the person of homas Howard, earl of Surrey, and his son, also 
homas, the Lord Admiral, the English were commanded by one of the most 
experienced and capable battleield leaders of the early sixteenth century. As 
homas Arnold has reminded us, changes in the art of war in the years after 1500 
meant that “battleield example mattered less, generalship more.” he increasing 
size of armies, the greater length of campaigns, and the diversity of theatres of 
war put a greater emphasis on the logistical and intellectual disciplines of war. 
he successful commander was increasingly judged as much, if not more so, by 
his ability to marshal his “maps and city plans, muster receipts and detailed lists of 
stores.”43 In most ways the logistics of the Flodden campaign were unremarkable: 
Surrey used the traditional northern staging posts of Newcastle and Alnwick to 
supply his army, while Lord homas Howard dropped anchor at Hull to victual 
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his force. Indeed, the haste with which Surrey dismissed his army is testimony to 
his appreciation that the host could be kept in the ield for only a short time. More 
crucially, it appears that Surrey ensured that the majority of the English army was 
mounted, allowing them to muster at Pontefract on 25 August and deploy ready 
for battle at Bolton in Glendale, near Alnwick castle in Northumberland, just 
ten days later.44 We have seen how local communities paid for their contingents 
to be horsed, while earlier in the year special musters for “horses and mares” had 
been held in the border counties. he later chronicler Edward Hall describes how 
Surrey’s army “kept array on horseback from fyve of the clocke in the mornynge 
tyll foure of the clocke at after none” on the day of the battle.45 
Indeed, Surrey was a student of warfare. In 1519 he commissioned the family’s 
elegist, Alexander Barclay, to produce a translation from the Latin of Sallust’s 
Jugurthine Wars. As William Sessions points out, this was evidence of the Howards’ 
interest in new Humanist thought and scholarship emerging in the early sixteenth 
century. It is important to note, however, that Howard commissioned a military 
title, thus joining the growing body of contemporary military commanders who 
looked to classical, as much as chivalric, models of military success.46 While the 
commissioning of translations of classical military treatises was not unique to the 
sixteenth century, in Surrey’s case the combination of academic interest and practical 
experience was important. His generalship, like that of James IV, may have been 
inspired by the spirit of the Renaissance, but unlike the Scottish king it was one 
tempered by the harsh experience of conlict. Surrey, of course, had fought and been 
wounded in the battle of Barnet in 1471, and he had seen action alongside his father 
(who had been killed) against the future Henry VII at the battle of Bosworth in 
1485. He had also travelled to France as part of a royal army in 1475, while in 1497 
he had personally led the successful resistance to the Scottish attack on Norham 
castle, raiding north of the border in retaliation and seizing, albeit temporarily, 
Ayton castle. Surrey, then, had an empathy with the men under his command and 
had earned their respect.47 his was evident, as we have seen, in his provision for 
their material needs. Yet his irst-hand experience of battle also gave him a deep 
respect for his comrades-in-arms, a trait evident in the way in which he took counsel 
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widely as king’s lieutenant in the north. At Flodden he consulted widely among his 
captains; indeed, decisions of the council were in efect ratiied by the whole army. 
As Edward Hall relates, concerning the English approach to the Scots’ army, “it was 
concluded betwene the erle and hys counsayll, and most parte of the armye thereto 
agreed” where the English should cross the River Twizzle.48 
his sense of fellowship was underscored by Surrey’s chivalric self-fashioning and 
the way in which he manipulated his image in the years after Flodden.49 “horde and 
behavoure of the right honourable Erle of Surrey . . . at the Batayle of Brankston,” a 
pro-Howard account of the battle printed by Richard Pynson, and which now exists 
only in manuscript, emphasised the earl’s skills as a general, but also his chivalric 
behaviour throughout the campaign.50 However, unlike James IV’s rash bravery, 
Surrey’s was measured, tempering prowess with prudence. At Pontefract, he carefully 
made provision for his ordnance and for the payment of his men’s wages and “the 
sayde Erle forgat nat to sende unto all Abbottes Pryours Lordes knyghtes Squyres and 
gentylmen rulers of Lybertyes and Townes of the sayde partyes commaunding them 
on the kynges behalfe to make theyr certyfycates unto hym with what nombre of able 
men theyr householde servauntes and tenauntes horsed and harnesede they wolde 
be redy vpon an houres warnynge to set forwardes at his ledynge.”51 hroughout the 
campaign Surrey endeavoured to present himself as a chivalric exemplar. As the king 
departed from Dover for Calais, the earl solemnly promised to make James IV sorry 
for preventing him from joining the royal expedition to France. On hearing of the 
Scottish siege of Norham castle, Surrey set forth from Newcastle, notwithstanding 
the foul weather which saw his guide almost drowned, “yet he letted no day but kept 
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forth his iourney unwardes to gyue example and tencourage them that shulde folow 
tyll he came” to Durham.52 In their communications with James IV on the eve of the 
battle both Surrey and his son followed chivalric protocol, promising justiication for 
the death of Andrew Barton ( James IV’s favourite privateer) two years earlier at the 
hands of Lord homas. Indeed, Lord homas stated that the Scottish king would ind 
him “in the vangarde of the fylde by the grace of Gode and seynte George and as he 
was true knyght.”53
Yet for all the Howards’ chivalric bravado, they understood that the responsible 
commander had a duty to safeguard himself and thus the cause for which he and 
his men fought. “horde and behavoure” made it clear that James IV’s conduct was 
rash, his death an example to all princes “how they shall here after put theyr owne 
persones in doyinge an enterpryse in the forefrounte of a batayle wherby suche 
befoure expressed daunger may ensue to thutter distruccyons of themselfe theyr 
Realmes and domynyons lyke as this is of the Realme of Scotlande now desolate 
and voyde of all noble men and ryght fewe or none lefte on lyve to Rule.”54 As 
such the Howards’ behaviour exempliied the contrast between the “hardy man,” 
one who rushes into battle to win glory regardless of the consequences to him 
and his comrades, and the “manly man,” whose training and discipline enables 
him to triumph over his foe for a common cause. he distinction had been made 
by several English soldiers and writers during the course of the ifteenth century 
and may have had its origins in the Ciceronian concept of the vir virtutis. Indeed, 
it was central to a particular concept of knightly service that melded traditional 
chivalric virtues with the new Humanist learning which was well known among 
the East Anglian gentry community of which the Howards were part and was 
the deining ethos of the early Tudor aristocracy.55 “horde and behavoure” thus 
served as notice of the Howards’ military philosophy, one that tempered chivalric 
bravery and formality with the practicalities of efective generalship.
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his essay started with one cliché and will end with another: there can be 
little doubt that Flodden stands on the boundary between the Middle Ages and 
the early modern period in the British Isles. here was much about the two armies 
that was recognisably medieval, drawing upon a centuries-old tradition of warfare 
between the two kingdoms. Both the English and Scottish armies were raised by 
calling upon the traditional obligations of the kings’ subjects, while the traditional 
military classes provided the ighting backbone of both sides. Chivalric bonds 
between companions-in-arms, albeit couched in the relatively modern formality 
of the bond of manrent or the newly negotiated political relationship between the 
early Tudor kings and their subjects, undoubtedly accounted for the high casualty 
rates among the lords and knights present at the battle, as much as the proiciency 
of new weapons or tactics. On the face of it, even the weaponry and tactics look 
recognisably medieval: both armies still fought predominantly on foot, the Scots 
armed with long spears, while the English appeared to have put their faith in 
the archery that had served them so well at Dupplin Moor, Neville’s Cross, and 
Humbleton Hill. However much James IV spent on pikes and French military 
advisors, it really seems highly unlikely that the Scottish army resembled the Swiss 
in anything more than their supericial appearance. he evidence the Scottish 
feudal levy had mastered the techniques of Renaissance warfare comes principally 
from the so-called “Articules of Bataill,” the oicial English report of the battle, 
which describes how the Scots advanced “after the Almayns maner.” he reference 
was repeated by Brian Tuke in his letter to Richard Pace. Yet the “Articules of 
Bataill” goes on to explain that the “Almayns maner” was to advance “withoute 
spekynge of eny worde.”56 No contemporary English observer explicitly compared 
Scottish tactics to those practised by the Swiss in the Italian Wars.
Yet there are ways in which Flodden provides glimpses of a new age. First, the 
composition of both the English and Scottish armies relected the new political 
reality that had resulted from Tudor and Stewart attempts to strengthen royal 
authority. In terms of weaponry and tactics, however, it is the English army that 
appears much the more “modern.” By successfully combining bows, bills, and pikes 
into an efective all-arms infantry force, the English demonstrated they had learnt 
the major lessons in the art of warfare as it had developed in the last quarter of the 
ifteenth century. Moreover, by integrating efectively light pieces of gunpowder 
artillery into their battleline (if not yet hand-held irearms) they were (unwittingly 
perhaps) emulating the successful tactics employed by the Spanish at Cerignola in 
1503.57 More importantly, perhaps, Flodden demonstrates a renewed emphasis on 
efective generalship, a search for perfection in the art of war driven, in part, by the 
intellectual dynamic of the north European Renaissance. In homas Howard, earl 
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of Surrey, the English enjoyed the talents of perhaps the irst British Renaissance 
general. Yet paradoxically, the same cultural forces that empowered Surrey also 
drove James IV to ight and die in the front ranks of his army. In his desire to 
embody the ideals of Renaissance monarchy, James approached the battle with 
the same recklessness that inspired Francis I to victory at Marignano in 1515 but 
which also saw the French king narrowly escape death and end up captured at the 
battle of Pavia a decade later.58
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